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This paper proposes that the hard problem of consciousness is
in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world.
This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for
the forms populating our image of the world are considered com-
putable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is
regarded as the problem, not the cube as a form. Form, however,
cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we
must re-examine the classic spatial metaphysics of space and time,
initiated by Galilei, wherein the real has been equated with the
quantitative and wherein quality has been stripped from the mate-
rial world. In this metaphysics, which sees form as quantitative or
computable, the origin of qualia is problematic, and a problem of
even greater primacy is the memory that supports the transforming
events of perception.
This article argues that memory is a necessary condition for
qualia. The storage of “snapshots” of time-flowing events, a notion
which the classic metaphysics engenders, is unworkable as a solution
to the perception of these flows. Form, in fact being dynamic and
defined over flowing fields, is a quality requiring this memory. Since
forms populate the image, the origin of the entire image is indeed
a problem. The proposed solution is based on Bergson’s temporal
metaphysics wherein motion is undivided, and the global motion of
the universal field itself carries an intrinsic form of memory. In this
framework, Bergson provided a unique solution – one that leaves the
problem of representation behind – as to how the brain specifies the
qualitative image of the dynamically transforming external world.
1. Introduction
The hard problem of consciousness as stated by Chalmers (1995) has
dominated contemporary discussion since the mid 1990s. How, Chalmers
essentially asked, after you have described your computer architecture and
your software programs, or your neural network or whatever architecture,
can you account for the qualia of the perceived world? Unfortunately, this
formulation with its sole emphasis on “qualia” is only partially correct
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and ultimately misleading. It has barred, so I claim, an elegant solution
provided over one hundred years ago to the real problem. In what follows,
I limit the discussion to vision and by simple extension to audition; more
general implications for other sense modalities and other aspects of qualia
will have to follow.
In my view, the hard problem is, in fact, the problem of the origin of
the perceived image of the external world. This straightforward statement
is neither grasped nor accepted in the debate, though it has been the
formulation of the problem for 2000 years, since at least the Greeks began
thinking about it (cf. Lombardo 1987). Some readers might feel that the
words “image” and “qualia” are interchangeable – and they should be
(nearly), but to my knowledge there are virtually no discussions about
qualia in terms of “explaining the origin of the image” in consciousness
studies.
In most academic debates it is flatly ignored that this is how the
qualia problem should be characterized. One can find three uses of the
term “image” in the Wikipedia entry on qualia: They refer to the retinal
image, to Tye’s dismissal of after-images as a problem for his theory, and
to Robinson’s defense of the vividness of the mental image. Crane’s (2011)
entry on the “Problem of Perception” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy contains plenty of “qualia” but not a single “image”. The same
applies to Siegel’s (2013) entry on “The Contents of Perception”, while
Tye’s (2013) entry on “Qualia” contains “image” in contexts essentially
irrelevant to his approach to the hard problem.
For the ancient philosophers of perception (cf. Lombardo 1987), the
problem was so strongly couched in terms of the notion of the image that it
was in effect an optical problem. But if one were to offer a solution to the
problem of the image of the external world today, it would arguably not
even be recognized as a contribution to the hard problem of consciousness
at all.
The reason for this state of affairs rests in the acceptance of a meta-
physics which can be traced to Galilei. Galilei’s crucial step was to suggest
that the real world is sufficiently characterized by quantitatively measur-
able properties, while other empirical aspects – the qualities of the expe-
rienced world – are somehow created by “the living organism”. Implicit
within this suggestion is the distinction between primary properties and
secondary properties, the former related to “real” quantities, the latter
related to qualities arising only due to the perspective of mental experi-
ence (cf. Manzotti 2008). In other words, Galilei stripped the material
world of quality at the formal inception of this metaphysics.1
Form itself, for the debaters of the hard problem, has been left to
1Both Berkeley (1734/1982) and Whitehead (1920) disputed the primary/secondary
disctinction. They could both be seen as questioning whether the classic metaphysics
actually possesses any ontological status.
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reside in Galilei’s quantitative world. Because of this, form has been
taken to be computational and the origin of the forms of objects in our
perception, or image, of the external world has not been considered an
issue. The “redness” of a cube in our vision, not the “cube-ness” of the
cube is considered significant. We see this position stated clearly, for
example, in an essay on qualia by Nida-Ru¨melin (2008). She feels forced
to differentiate between color as an “appearance property” and shape,
which she says is not such a property. In other words, color is regarded
as a problem, form is not regarded as a problem – yet forms populate our
experienced image of the world.
For Wright (2008), qualia apply to all “sense fields” in all modalities,
but not to “perceived items”. In other words, qualia do not apply to ob-
jects and forms. The transparency thesis (cf. Kind 2008) holds that our
experience does not reveal the existence of any qualia, for our experience
is transparent – when we attend to our experiences, our attention goes
right through to their objects (e.g., Tye 1995). The formulation “right
through to their objects” implies a static object without quality, in par-
ticular where form is no quality, ignoring that the time-extended motions
of objects may themselves be qualia. Therefore, the origin of the image of
the external world, populated with forms, is not considered the problem.
However, the Galilean position is misleading. Form can no more be
assigned to the quantitative and computable than any other aspect of the
experienced world. Form is a quality. If form is not computable, it can no
more be accounted for by any computer or neural network architecture
than any of the other aspects of the world that are termed “qualia”. This
is to say that the origin of everything about our image of the external
world is a mystery exactly as qualia are.
Form cannot be divorced from motion. “Form”, noted Bergson (1907),
“is simply a snapshot of change”. But the classic metaphysics, given its
apparent usefulness in scientific explanation, is incapable of describing
genuine motion or change. This is to say, it is incapable of handling
genuine time. To solve the hard problem, regarded as the origin of the
image of the external world, the classic metaphysics must be abandoned,
and concommitantly, we must revise our ideas about time and its relation
to mind.
2. The Classic Spatial Metaphysics
The classic metaphysics, reprising Bergson’s (1896/1912) analysis of it,
is a “projection frame”, or epistemological framework, for our theories of
the real, both in physics and psychology. It is based on an abstract space as
an imposed and arbitrary static backdrop. It is a framework ubiquitously
engrained, and extremely useful for the mathematical theory of matter.
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Yet this usefulness is so enthralling that the framework itself is often taken
for an ontological reality, i.e. for the actual structure and dynamics of the
universe.
Bergson argued that this obscures deeper penetration into the physi-
cal world – and some of his physicist commentators, looking back at the
nature of what would eventually emerge in quantum mechanics, agreed
(cf. Gunter 1969). It is precisely the job of theory, Bergson (1896/1912)
proposed, to break through this imposed framework. As he put it, “a the-
ory of matter is an attempt to find the reality hidden beneath ... custom-
ary images which are entirely relative to our needs” (Bergson 1896/1912,
p. 254).
These needs begin in our perception itself. The body and brain are
embedded in, and an integral part of, the surrounding material world
(the field of matter). The task of the brain in perception is to identify,
in this ever-transforming field, objects upon which the body can act – to
lift a spoon, to throw a rock. This is the elementary partition made by
perception – objects and motions in the field. The notion of objects is
increasingly refined – in the classic metaphysics – with the material field
taken as a continuum of points or positions. The motion of any object
in this continuum is conceived to follow a trajectory, which itself consists
of a set of points/positions. Each point successively occupied (or passed
over) by the moving object is seen to correspond to an instant of time.
Thus time itself is treated as merely another dimension of this abstract
spatial continuum.
The continuum is infinitely divisible. In fact, as Bergson (1896/1912)
noted, it can actually be considered “a principle of infinite divisibility”.
The trajectory of an object is a line in space, and successive divisions of
the line reduce it of a set of points. Since two adjacent points on the
object’s trajectory are just static points, to explain motion between two
static points, we must insert a new, yet smaller line of points between the
two, leading to the description of motion by successively occupied points
yet again.
The result of this infinite operation of division (assuming that it can be
conceived to end) would at best be a mathematical point. At such a point,
there is no motion, no evolution in time of the material field. Further, as
every spatially extended object is subject to this infinite decomposition
throughout the continuum, we end up with a completely homogeneous
field of mathematical points. The continuum of mathematical points then,
both spatially and temporally, can have no qualities – qualities at the least
imply heterogeneity.
This is an essential case in point for the qualia problem. The matter-
field contains no qualities – objects have no coloredness, there is no sound-
ness, etc. Where, on the contrary, the existence of qualities in the field
is affirmed, the metaphysical framework for this is rarely (e.g. Strawson,
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2006) explicitly declared, including the used model for time and space.
As we shall see, raising this framework to conscious awareness is crucial.
Another important point is that the vast preponderance of examples
of qualia are static. For example, we note the redness of red, the taste
of cauliflower, the feel of velvet, the smell of fresh cut grass. Seldom
are qualities of motions ever discussed, e.g., the twisting of falling leaves,
the gyrations of a wobbling, rotating cube, the buzzing of a fly. Where
a hint of motion and time is introduced – “the conductor waving her
hands, the musicians concentrating, patrons shifting in their seats, and
the curtains gently and ever-so-slightly waving” (Hardcastle 1995, p. 1) –
time is quickly ignored as part of the problem.
This glaring lack indicates the stumbling block that the treatment of
motion and time in the classic metaphysics has induced. A time that is
merely another dimension of the infinitely divisible space – a set or series
of mathematical point-instants – is completely homogeneous. Any motion
in this space, logically, has no duration greater than a mathematical point,
then another point, then another. How is it possible, then, that any of the
time-extended motions – the shifting patrons in the symphony, the gently
waving curtains – are perceived by us as motions? These are equally qual-
ities, as Hardcastle (1995) admits. They arise, just as problematically as
the static colors of objects, in the homogenous time dimension of infinitely
divisible instants in this continuum.
In the Galilean framework we are immediately thrown into the problem
of the memory that connects time instants, for any qualia defined over
time, and this is all qualia, must endure over at least two such instants.
Appropriating James’ (1890, pp. 643–645) term, and driving it to an even
more primitive level, it becomes the search for the “primary memory” that
supports the elemental, time-flowing, qualia-laden events of perception.
The nature of this memory, it can be argued (Robbins 2004), is an integral
part of the problem. This is to say that “temporal consciousness” itself
(Dainton 2010) is, at its most basic level, a problem of qualia.
The brain, in the classic metaphysics, is an inescapable part of the
abstract continuum. When objects like light rays move along their trajec-
tories and strike objects like eyes in the brain, the abstract, homogeneous
motions, all reducible in time-extent to mathematical points, simply con-
tinue in the brain. Nowhere in the brain, taken as part of the continuum,
can there be anything but more homogeneous points/instants. There can
be no actual coherent time-extent of motions through the nerves, no “con-
tinuity of time-extended neural processes” – again, the logical time extent
of any neural process is never more than a mathematical point, then an-
other, then another... However one conceives of these motions, whether
as firing connectionist networks, symbolic manipulations via neural pro-
grams, or resonance to invariants over a structure of field motions relative
to the bodys action systems, one will never find qualities.
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We cannot explain how we experience a cube rotating, let alone a blue
cube. Therefore, all qualia are logically expelled out of the continuum into
the non-physical, the experiential. But the step by which the expulsion of
events into another realm can occur remains a dilemma. The structure of
the metaphysics leaves the nature of realms outside the material – e.g., the
conscious experience – undefinable for science, for science operates within
this (classic) metaphysics. The notion of qualia is the symbol for this
problem. What is the origin of the perceived qualities of the matter-field
of the classic spatial metaphysics?
3. Form as Flow
Form, as noted above, has been exempted from this problem by phi-
losophy, but not only there. The approach to form has typically been as
to a static subject. An object recognition model due to Hummel and Bie-
derman (1992) is illustrative. Introducing their model, the authors argued
that form recognition, for example, of a standard cube, cannot follow a
straightforward model of decomposition into, and re-assembly from, sets
of features – edges, vertices, straight lines. This is due to the fact that
once the features are separately identified (disassembled), the actual spa-
tial relations are lost and the features can now be recomposed in any
number of possible ways where the results look not at all like the original
cube (Figure 1). To solve this problem, they used “geons”, elementary
solids such as cones, wedges, cylinders or bricks, which are recognized by
features such as straight or curved contours and cross-sections, and into
which the forms are analyzed so that the original spatial relations are
retained.
In a review of the problem of dynamic form (Robbins 2004), I noted
that Hummel and Biederman’s approach suffered on several points. For
one, the classic fields of Hubel and Wiesel (1959, 1979), with their im-
plication of detected, static features, cannot be regarded as the building
blocks of a scene (Nakayama 1998). Another issue, by their own admis-
sion, is that the “fast-enabling links” needed for the model have yet to be
found. Worse, the model is subject to the “correspondence problem”, a
problem inherent in assuming that the visual system matches correspond-
ing points or features in successive frames of an event. This problem is
deemed intractable. If Hummel and Biederman’s example of the cube
and the cone were rotating, a model would not only have to deal with
the feature jumbling, it would have to explain how the features (edges,
vertices) are tracked (their identity preserved) from frame to frame. This
holds too for the features of the geons. In essence, the primary problem is
the static conception of form. As I described in the context of yet another
problem, namely the concept that a rigidity constraint is employed by the
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Figure 1: Both objects, the cube and the cone, have the same features,
and therefore can be recognized on the basis of a feature match (after
Hummel and Biederman 1992).
brain (Ullman 1979, 1986) to compute form (such as the rotating cube)
under dynamic transformations, this concept was abandoned as well. The
current conception of the derivation of form is very different; it is based
on velocity flows.
Gibson (1950, 1966) pointed to the significance of texture gradients
and optical flow fields (Figure 2). Driven by a desire to bypass the corre-
spondence problem, current perception theory sees perceived form as de-
rived from velocity fields in conjunction with Bayesian constraints. The
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Figure 2. Optical flow field.  A gradient of 
velocity vectors is created as an observer moves 
towards the mountains.  The flow field “expands” 
as the observer moves.   At right, the flow as a flag 
rotates towards the observer.  (Robbins, 2004) 
 
           Gibson (1950, 1966) pointed to the significance of texture gradients and optic flow fields 
(Figure 2).   Driven by a desire to bypass the correspondence problem, current perception theory 
sees perceived form as derived from these velocity fields in conjunction with Bayesian 
constraints.  The models, known as “energy” models (Adelson and Bergen, 1985; Watson and 
Ahumuda, 1983), are built upon arrays of elementary spatiotemporal filters, and such filters, 
because of their limited receptive fields, are subject to the aperture problem  (Figure 3).  As such, 
the estimate of velocities is inherently uncertain, forcing a probabilistic approach (Robbins, 2004, 
for a review).  
 
Figure 3.  The aperture problem.  The card with the grating is 
moving to the right, and passes beneath the card with the 
circular aperture.  The ends of the moving lines are now 
obscured, and only the downward motion of the lines is seen in 
the aperture (Robbins, 2006b). 
 
       One of the fundamental (Bayesian) constraints used by Weiss, Simoncelli and Adelson 
(2002) is “motion is slow and smooth.”  The model explains a very large array of “illusions.” In 
fact, due to this inherent measurement uncertainty, all perception, “veridical” or otherwise, the 
Figure 2: A gradient of velocity vectors is created as an observer moves
towards the mountains. The “optical flow field” expands as the observer
moves. At right, the flow as a flag rotates towards the observer (Robbins
2004).
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models, known as “energy” models (Adelson and Bergen 1985, Watson
and Ahumuda 1983), are built upon arrays of elementary spatiotemporal
filters. Such filters, because of their limited receptive fields, are subject
to the aperture problem (Figure 3). As such, the estimate of velocities is
inherently uncertain, forcing a probabilistic approach (Robbins 2004).
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The ends of the moving lines are now obscured, and only the downward
motion of the lines is seen in the aperture (Robbins 2007).
One of the f ndamental (Bayesian) constraints used by Weiss et al.
(2002) is that “motion is slow and smooth”. This constraint explains a
very large set of “illusions”. The authors argued that due to the inherent
measurement uncertainty all perception, “veridical” or otherwise, must be
viewed as an optimal percept based upon the best available information.
Applied to the velocity fields defining a narrow rotating ellipse (Figure 4),
for example, the violation of this “slow and smooth” constraint ends in
specifying a non-rigid object if the motion is too fast (Mussati’s illusion;
Mussati 1924).
If we were to consider a rotating “Gibsonian” cube, its form becomes
a partitioned set of these velocity fields. As each side rotates into view, an
expanding flow field (like the flag of Fig. 2) is defined. As the side rotates
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Figure 4.  The normal velocity components (right) of the 
edge of a rotating ellipse (left).  These tend to induce 
non-rigid motion. (After Weiss and Adelson, 1998)   
 
       If we were to consider a rotating “Gibsonian” cube, this form becomes a partitioned set of 
these velocity fields.  As each side rotates into view, an expanding flow field (like the flag of 
Figure 2) is defined.  As the side rotates out of view, a contracting flow field is defined.  The top 
of the cube is a radial flow field.  The “edges” and “vertices” (i.e., “features”) of this cube are 
now simply sharp discontinuities in these flows.  The implications of this are concretely displayed 
in a demonstration discussed by Shaw and McIntyre (1974) with a rotating wire cube (Figure 5).  
A cube naturally has a symmetry period of four – it is carried into itself every 90 degree rotation.  
(Symmetry, it should be understood, is invariance).  When the cube is strobed in phase with or at 
integral multiple of its symmetry period, it appears, indeed, as a cube in rotation.  But when it is 
strobed out-of-phase, it becomes a distorted, wobbly, plastic or non-rigid object.  In this wobbly 
“not-cube” case, the constraint (invariance) likely being violated via the arrhythmic strobe is this: 
a regular form displays a regular periodicity in time. 
Figure 4: The normal velocity components (right) of the edge of a rotating
ellipse (left) tend to induce non-rigid motion (after Weiss and Adelson
1998).
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Figure 5: Rotating cubes, strobed in phase with, or out of phase with,
the symmetry period of the cube (Robbins 2004).
out of view, a contracting flow field is defined. The top of the cube is
a radial flow field. The edges and vertices of this cube are now sharp
discontinuities in the flows. The implications are concretely displayed in
a demonstration discussed by Shaw and McIntyre (1974) with a rotating
wire cube (Figure 5).
A cube naturally has a symmetry period of four – it is carried into
itself by rotations of 90 degrees. (Symmetry, it should be understood,
is i variance). When the cube is strobed in phase with or at int ger
multiples of its symmetry period, it appears indeed as a cube in rotation.
But when it is strobed out-of-phase, it becomes a distorted, wobbly, plastic
or non-rigid object. In this wobbly “non-cube” case, the constraint that
a regular form displays a regular periodicity in time is likely violated via
the arhythmic strobe.
The strobe essentially takes snapshots of the cube. Yet these snapshots
are not sufficient to specify the rigid cubical form we would expect; they
are not sufficient to specify the straight lines, straight edges, corners or
vertices – the standard static, geometric features of a cube.
As Gibson (1966, 1979) long argued, the concepts of Euclidean geom-
etry – straight lines, curves, v rtices, families of forms related by geomet-
rical transformations, even geons – have little meaning to the brain. They
are not the elements by which the brain constructs a world.2 Rather, the
forms being specified are functions of the application of constraints on
flowing fields. The structure of the forms reflects invariants existing over
these time-extended flows.
2The fact that we find cells that are sensitive to the motion of straight lines in
the small area of their receptive fields does not mean that the brain works, or is pro-
grammed, as though space were Euclidean, i.e. that this construct – itself a derivative
of perception and human conceptual development – is inherent in or built into the
brain. As I noted earlier, elements of Euclidean space are no longer considered the
building blocks of a scene (Nakayama 1998).
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4. Form and the Scale of Time
All form is a function of the time scale imposed on this continuous
flow. The cube, rotating at a certain rate and perceived as a cube in
rotation, is a function of a scale of time imposed by the dynamics of
the brain. We could increase the velocity of the cube’s rotation. With
sufficient increase, it will become a serrated-edged figure, and at a higher
rate, a figure with even more serrations. Finally, it becomes a cylinder
surrounded by a fuzzy haze. Each of these figures has 4n-fold symmetry
– 8-edged, 12-edged, 16-edged, and so on – with the cylinder it becomes
a figure of continuous symmetry (Figure 6). This transitional series of
forms reflects the scale of time in which we normally dwell.
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figure of infinite symmetry (Figure 6).  In total, this transitional series of forms reflects the scale 
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      Let us perform a gedanken experiment.  We envision the dynamics of the brain as a hierarchy 
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introduce change at one “level” and  the whole is changed.  One level in this dynamics is the 
chemical and thus the chemical velocities supporting the brain’s computations.  The range and 
complexity of these, considering the various local velocities, is vast, but at least in principle, it 
can be argued (cf. Hoaglund, 1966; Fischer, 1966), the global process velocity could be changed; 
we could introduce some catalyst or set of catalysts to effect this.  Even raising the temperature in 
such a system is sufficient to affect the chemical velocities.  
 
Figure 6.  Successive transformations of the 
rotating cube (2-D view) through figures of 4n-
fold symmetry as angular velocity increases.  
 
       Suppose then two observers, A and B.  Observer A, dwelling in our normal scale, is gazing 
upon a cube rotating rapidly enough to be perceived as a 16-edged serrated figure.  Observer B 
has had his global process velocity raised.  His scale has been shifted.  He perceives the same 
cube, but as a cube of normal four-sided construction slowly rotating.  Both perceive by the same 
law of invariance – a figure of 4n-fold symmetry.  Suppose A and B are watching a time-lapse 
film of the growth of a human head in profile (Figure 7). At a given film rate, the head is 
transforming very rapidly for A; for B, it is a much slower event.  Both perceive the transforming 
head by the same law – a strain transformation applied to a cardioid.  Were we to borrow from 
physics, we might say that we have performed an operation analogous to changing the “space-
time partition.”  From this perspective, a deeper significance of Gibson’s (1966) insistence on 
Figure 6: Two-dimensional view of successive transformations of the ro-
tating cube through figures of 4n-fold symmetry as angular velocity in-
creases.
Let us now perform a thought experiment. We envision the dynamics
of the brain as a hie archy of levels – at m c, molecular, neural, etc. But
the brain is a coherent biological system – introduce change at one level
and the whole is changed. One level in this dynamics is the chemical level,
and thus the chemical velocities support the brain’s computations. Their
range and complexity, considering the various local velocities, is vast, but
least in principle it can be argued (Hoaglund 19 6) that the global
process velocity could be changed. We could introduce some catalyst or
set of catalysts to effect this. Even raising the temperature in such a
system is sufficient to affect the chemical velocities.
Suppose then two observers, A and B. Observer A, dwelling in our
normal scale, is gazing upon a cube rotati g rapidl enough to be per-
ceived as a 16-edged serrated figure. Observer B has his global process
velocity raised. His scale has been shifted. He perceives the same cube,
but as a cube of normal four-sided construction slowly rotating. Both
perceive by the same law of invariance – a figure of 4n-fold symmetry. Or
suppose A and B re watching a time-lapse film of the growth of a human
head in profile (Figure 7). At a given film rate, the head is transforming
very rapidly for A; for B it is a much slower event. Both perceive the
transforming head by the same law – a strain transformation applied to
a cardioid.
Were we to borrow from physics, we might say hat we have perform d
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invariance laws defining events could be understood.  In such transforming partitions, it is only 
invariance laws (e.g., d = vt, d’= vt’) that hold.  
       Extend this scale transformation.  Raising the process velocity carries a corresponding 
decrease in the scale of time.  If a fly is passing before both observers, for observer A it is a 
“buzzing” fly of our normal scale; for observer B, the fly is now flapping its wings slowly, like a 
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“stable” form – a book, a cup, a picture – is nevertheless a sea of motion.  Going “right through to 
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possible scale of time for the fly or the cube as well as for all the possible constraints operating in 
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Figure 7: Aging of the facial profile. A cardioid is fitted to the skull and
a strain transformation is applied. Strain is equivalent to the stretching
of the meshes of a coordinate system in all directions. Shown are a few of
the possible profiles generated (adapted from Pittenger and Shaw 1975).
an operation analogous to changing the “space-time partition”. From
this perspective, a deeper significance of Gibson’s (1966) insistence on
invariance laws defining events can be understood. In such transforming
partitions, it is only invariance laws (e.g. d = vt, d′ = vt′) that hold.
Now let us extend the scale transformation. Raising the process ve-
locity entails a corresponding decrease in the time scale. If a fly passes
before both observers, for observer A it is a “buzzing” fly f our normal
scale; for observer B the fly is now flapping its wings slowly, like a heron.
As the process velocity of B is raised further, the fly transforms to a near-
motionless fly with wings barely moving, then to a motionless fly, then to
a vibrating, crystalline form, then to a collection of waves.
At the very minute scale of time we are now co sidering, we realize
that even the most stable form – a book, a cup, a picture – is nevertheless
a sea of motion. Going “right through to the object” takes us only to
this sea of motion. A rotating cube is only one form of the cube as a
continuous event. Form is indeed a snapshot of change. It is within this
sea of motion that the brain actually dwells. The brain too is a form
within the very same sea of motion.3
3All of these facts showing that forms are time-scale and constraint specific qualities
speak against hypotheses such as that by Hameroff and Penrose (1996) where qualia
are virtually little atoms residing in microtubules just waiting to be “configured” for
appearing as the external world. Are there going to be “form qualia” residing in the
microtubules for every possible time scale f r the fly or the cub as well as for all the
possible constraints operating in the specification of these forms? What could form
qualia be other than the forms themselves?
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5. The Undividedness of Motion
An invariant defined over motion cannot exist in an “instant” of time.
This is to say there is no instantaneous local or global state of the brain in
which such an invariant exists. Hence, the uncertainty introduced by the
aperture problem is simply an expression of the fundamental uncertainty
introduced by the flow of time itself. Psychology then shares a problem
with physics. The root of the problem for our theories is the conceptual
framework of the abstract space of the classic metaphysics in which the
very notion of an instant takes its meaning. Physics has steadily been
dissolving this framework.
The classical description of motion is an infinite regress. Between
each pair of static points occupied by a moving object, to account for the
motion, we must insert another trajectory or line, itself divisible into a
set of static points – ad infinitum. This principle of infinite divisibility,
Bergson argued (1896/1912), is the root of Zeno’s paradoxes. If the steps
of Achilles are viewed in terms of the infinitely divisible space he traverses,
they can be successively halved – he never catches the turtle. The arrow in
flight, occupying successive spatial points, never moves. Motion, Bergson
argued, must be treated as undivided. We must not confuse the space
traversed – the trajectory – with the motion. The arrow is in a state of
undivided motion. It is never at a particular point.4
It is often held that quantum physics applies only at the microlevel,
not at the level of processes which psychology addresses (Simon 1995,
Pinker 1997). But I think this fails to appreciate the implications for
time in modern physics. Physics has gradually rid itself of the notion of
a trajectory. DeBroglie (1947/1969), commenting on Bergson and on the
implications of Heisenberg’s uncertainty, already noted that in essence the
attempted measurement of a velocity projects the motion to a point in
our abstract spatial continuum, and in doing so we have lost the motion.
Feynman and Hibbs (1965) provided a proof that the motion of a
particle is continuous, but not differentiable. Nottale (1996) argued that
we must abandon the notion that space-time is differentiable. Nottale
referenced the geodesics that describe the motions of all particles in space-
time – obviously a huge, sweeping scope – and his theory treats these
curves as fractal, i.e. they are irregular and constantly changing at every
scale; there are no straight lines. “At every scale” means that anywhere
4There is a common conception that these paradoxes have been resolved by Rus-
sell (1903) and/or modern mathematics. However, this is far from correct. Good
discussions of the actual issues are due to Huggett (2010), Lynds (2003b), and Berg-
son (1907/1912, pp. 335–340). For Bergson, all Zeno’s paradoxes arise from the mis-
identification of an undivided motion with the infinitely divisible space traversed, ev-
idenced ultimately even more clearly by the fourth paradox, where Zeno declares a
motion “the double of itself”. Russell, having missed the point, actually accepted the
fourth paradox as a physical reality.
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one looks at one of these curves, at the most infinitesimal of scales, one
will find an inflection point, hence these curves are non-differentiable –
there is no velocity derivable at an instant. In Nottale’s words, “space-
time is non-differentiable”. This is also an overturning – along with the
critique of Bergson – of what has hitherto been a mainstay of the theory
of motion in classic metaphysics.
The essence of differentiation is division, say of a motion from A to
B, into successively smaller units, finally taking the limit of unit size
toward zero. To state that space-time is non-differentiable another way,
we may say the global evolution of the matter-field over time cannot be
treated as an infinitely divisible series of states. Thus Lynds (2003a)
argues, echoing Bergson, that there is no precise, static instant in time
underlying a dynamical physical process. If there were such, motion and
variation in all physical magnitudes would not be possible, as they (and
the universe itself) would be frozen static at that precise instant.
At no time, then, is the position of a body (or edge, vertex, feature,
etc.) or a physical magnitude precisely determined in an interval, no
matter how small, as at no time is it not permanently changing and un-
determined. There is a tradeoff between precisely determined values and
continuity through time. As Lynds (2003a) states, it is only the human
observer (mentally immersed in the abstract space) who imposes a precise
instant in time upon a physical process. There is no equation of motion
in physics that is not subject to this indeterminacy.
The brain is integrally embedded in a matter-field transforming in an
undivided flow. It cannot use in its computations what, to it, does not
exist. There are no static features – edges, vertices, angles – found at
an instant within the brain. There are no instants. A set of cell assem-
blies, each capturing a feature of a rotating cube, and phase-locked with
other assemblies, firing “instant” by “instant” to register to a higher order
brick/geon cell, is not only begging a solution to the correspondence prob-
lem, it is an illusory architecture. It describes nothing actually existing
in the brain. The brain is not operating in the classic metaphysics.
In such a scheme, each point (or spatial view) in a succession of points
on the curvilinear trajectory of the cube’s rotation would correspond to
synchronous firing of the phase-locked assemblies, each instant specifying
the geon underlying the cube’s structure. But the result of the out-of-
phase sampling of the strobe is sufficient to back the assertion that no
such structure exists in any given instant. Even within an “instant” there
is flow. Were a sample sufficient, a rigid cube would always be specified.
Further, a brain-driven sampling mechanism, to allow the specification of
a cube-in-rotation, would have to be pre-adjusted to the symmetry period
of the cube. This would require a form of pre-cognition. And what if there
were two or more cubes rotating at different rates?
A constraint applied to velocity fields expresses an invariance. The se-
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ries “rotating cube → figures of increasing serrated edges → fuzzy cylin-
der” expresses an invariance defining figures of 4n-fold symmetry. The
forms being specified are functions of the application of constraints on
flowing fields. The basis of form, as noted earlier, is invariance over the
time-extended, flowing field.5
The treatment of motion via an abstract space can provide no expla-
nation for our everyday perception of rotating cubes or twisting leaves,
i.e., for the very continuity and time-extension of the events we perceive.
If the “present” instant of the leaf’s twisting instantly becomes past, we
must store it in the brain to preserve it, for the “past” is, for the classic
metaphysics, the symbol of non-existence. In this scheme, only the always
“present” brain can store the past.
In this way, cognitive science faces the consequences Zeno forced his
contemporaries to face. Ignoring all the problems of sampling already
noted, if we presume the brain takes and stores samples of the rotation
or the twisting over time, we re-initiate the logical regress. The sam-
ples are static points – immobiltities – like successive photographs of the
twisting leaf laid out upon a desktop. If we imagine there is an “internal
scanner” of the samples, we must now explain how the scanner perceives
motion. Similarly, the logic of the abstract space prevents us from invok-
ing the “continuity of neural processes” to explain the time-extension of
the perception.
But then, how are the “instants” held together to support a perception
of a stirring spoon or a falling leaf? There is theoretical work on how the
brain might “integrate” instants to support these perceptions, i.e. support
temporal consciousness or the experience of flow, often involving some sort
of memory storage such as working memory (cf. Wittmann 2011). There
are several problems with this effort. Firstly, as we have seen above,
the classic metaphysics actually denies the possibility of flow as primary.
If logically nothing exists but an infinitely small instant, unless you are
explicitly appealing to a different metaphysics, or some other realm in
general (such as “consciousness”), integration processes avail nothing.
Trying to be brief here on a topic that requires greater discussion
(Robbins 2007, 2012a), when it comes to events, the theory of memory
has little idea what is actually stored in the first place, i.e. in the working
memory. The “snapshots”, it is well understood, cannot be photograph-
like copies in the brain, say of slices of the moving fly or rotating cube, nor
for that matter is there any principle on which such slices are selected.
This leads to the notion that there is storage of the “features‘” of an
event. There are no principled theories as to what these features actually
are, or how they would be reassembled as the original event, let alone
5For the fundamental role of invariance laws in scientific explanation see Wigner
(1970) for physics, Woodward (2000, 2001) for biology, and Kugler and Turvey (1987)
for perception and action.
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dealing with the fact that this disassemble-reassemble process must occur
continually, repeatedly, to construct the fly in motion (at some scale of
time).
And yet, the moving fly is integrated into a static storage area, so
we wonder how this equals the perception of a motion? Perhaps we are
visualizing the creation of a four-dimensional extended structure. But this
– problematic as to where such a structure would exist – is still a static
structure, and requires, again, a “scanner” to create “motion”. Finally,
none of these models, to my knowledge, have even thought of attempting
to deal with form where features exist only over flowing fields. How are
these flowing fields stored?
6. The Temporal Metaphysics
That the classical treatment of motion is an infinite regress is one
problem, yet there is another: in the abstract continuum, the motion
of any object is relative – I can move the object over the continuum or
the continuum (or coordinate system) beneath the object. Motion now
becomes rest or immobility purely on perspective. But in the material
field, there must be real motion – trees grow, stars explode, coffee is
stirred, couch potatoes get fat.
A real motion such as the growth of a tree taken as a set of points,
is a system of simultaneities, a simultaneous causal flow (Robbins 2010).
No arbitrary part of this motion can be relativized – declared at rest or
motionless relative to the remainder of the moving (growing) system, nor
can the motion of the whole of this flow be relativized. It is a real, not a
relative motion. This motion or growth can be modeled via the abstract
space and its point-continuum, but the continuum has properties which
are meaningless to the real motion of the tree. Nor, we would quickly
discover, can the tree as an object be isolated from the rest of the dynamic
flow of the universe. In this sense, Bergson (1896(1912, p. 225) noted:
Though we are free to attribute rest or motion to any material
point taken by itself, it is nonetheless true that the aspect of the
material universe changes, that the internal configuration of every
real system varies, and that here we have no longer the choice
between mobility and rest. Movement, whatever its inner nature,
becomes an indisputable reality. We may not be able to say what
parts of the whole are in motion, motion there is in the whole
nonetheless.
We must view the entire matter-field as in global motion over time.
We must see the whole changing, Bergson argued, “as though it were
a kaleidoscope”. We want to ask if an individual object X is at rest,
while another individual object Y is in motion. But both objects are
168 Robbins
arbitrary partitions, phases in this globally transforming field. As such,
the motions of objects are seen as changes or transferences of state –
rippling waves if you will – within the dynamic motion of the whole.
Bergson’s positive characterization of this motion is that each instant, like
a note in a melody, permeates and penetrates the next and reflects the
entire preceding series – an organic continuity. In this characterization,
time is clearly irreversible.
Undivided and non-differentiable motion is an elementary property of
memory in the field’s motion – each (now past) instant does not cease to
exist as the next (the present) instant appears. It is this “primary mem-
ory” – an intrinsic attribute of the time-evolution or transformation of the
material field – that supports our perception of “stirring” spoons, “twist-
ing” leaves, “rotating” cubes. Quality is now inherent in this motion of
the material field. At a time-scale of about zero, the field is near the ho-
mogeneity envisioned by the classic metaphysics, but at ever larger scales
of time, where the oscillations of the field (e.g., the 400 billion/sec oscil-
lations of the field associated with “red” light) are “compressed” in the
experience of a moment, more and more differentiated qualities emerge.
We are then led to realize that the time-extent of events in perception
in fact must derive from the undivided motion of the material field. The
reliance on this property of the motion of the field is true not only for the
“rotation” of the cube, but also for its “coloredess”, both qualities now
seen as “optimal specifications” of the undivided motion of the field.6
6Dainton (2010) provides an excellent in-depth discussion of various philosophical
stances on the consciousness of time and the experience of succession, while Wittmann
(2011) reviews the research on the subject. Among Dainton’s three classifications, the
“cinematic” model corresponds most closely to the concept discussed here: that the
brain is taking a series of “snaphsots”, with the consequent difficulties for actually
explaining the experience of motion. The “retentional” model has “episodes of con-
sciousness which themselves lack temporal extension, but whose contents present (or
represent) temporally extended intervals and phenomena”. The “extensional” model
has episodes of experiencing that are themselves temporally extended and are thus
able to incorporate change in a quite straightforward way. There is no space here to
embrace and fully comment on Dainton’s wide-ranging examination of various philo-
sophical positions. The discussion proceeds under the concept of explaining “temporal
consciousness”, but lurking under all these theories is the physical brain, and thus
physics and its concept of time.
What I emphasize, and this is missing in Dainton’s comment on Bergson, is that we
are always driven to the metaphysics of physical motion, and this takes us to Zeno’s
paradoxes, to Nottale, and to Lynds. Firstly, it is the structure of this metaphysics,
that provides the framework in which the problem of qualia is (unfruitfully) discussed.
Secondly, realizing that the motion of the universal field is undivided, we obtain the
primary memory that marks consciousness itself, derived from the brain’s being an
integral participant in the flow of that field. Our model of the motion of this field
accounts for the experience of flow. We are not dealing (at least not solely) with
a realm of temporal consciousness regarded as separate from physics. This separate
realm brings up the fact that the phenomena of temporal consciousnessas are nothing
else than the problem of qualia itself. This was the message of Robbins (2004).
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7. The Origin of the Image of the External World
Grasping the true nature of a problem, it is often said, is to see the
solution. The problem of consciousness is the origin of the image of the
external world. Yet, we know that nothing is stored or going on in the
brain that even vaguely resembles an image of the external world – in the
brain we see just neural-chemical flows. We can only ask, unsuccessfully,
how these neural processes somehow “represent” the external world or
“encode” it, which is to say, represent or encode our image of the world.
If it is a neural code, then as per any code, three dots “ · · · ”, can be
an “S” in Morse code, the three blind mice, or da Vinci’s nose. What is
the domain that the code is mapped to? And how could the brain map
anything to this domain – the external world – without already knowing
what the world looks like?
This “coding” (or “representation”) problem for the image of the world
has been as much a hard problem of consciousness as that of qualia. But
regarding forms as qualia, in fact invariants defined over flowing fields,
requires the abandonment of the classic metaphysics of motion and time.
We need undivided global motion of the universal field as in Bergson’s
temporal metaphysics. For the origin of this qualitative image of the dy-
namically transforming external world, Bergson had an elegant solution.
Already in 1896, he anticipated the essence of holography, a prescience
that obscured the nature of his theory to his contemporaries. He realized
that the dynamically transforming field is holographic – the state of each
point in the field is the reflection of, and carries information for, the whole.
The mutual interrelation, of which every object in the field is a nexus,
cannot be represented in its entirety. Thus, Bergson noted, every aspect of
our notion of the material world is necessarily an “image”, i.e. inescapably
only a part, a limited representation, of the whole. The “atoms” of the
material world are an image. The “brain” and its “neurons” are an image.
How does one such image – the brain or its atoms – obtain a privileged
position, gaining the power to represent the other images as image? This
is precisely what the representationalist assume. The brain as part of the
abstract, homogeneous space, now described by whatever abstract image
one chooses – atoms, molecules, neurons – and of the same order as these
images, is given the inexplicable power to create an image of the exter-
nal material field, an image now necessarily qualitative, with colors and
forms, with time-scale and time-extent, a qualitative image that now by
definition must reside in some ever-mysterious realm outside the abstract,
homogeneous space. This is a crass psychophysical parallelism (cf. Berg-
son’s (1904/1920) critique), and the current debates on the subtleties of
this inexplicable realm perpetuate it.
This was Bergson’s solution: Noting that there is, and can be, no
“photograph” of the external field developed in the brain, he stated his
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vision of the holographic nature of the material field (Bergson 1896/1912,
p. 31, emphasis added) like this:
But is it not obvious that the photograph, if photograph there be,
is already taken, already developed in the very heart of things and
at all points in space. No metaphysics, no physics can escape this
conclusion. Build up the universe with atoms: Each of them is
subject to the action, variable in quantity and quality according to
the distance, exerted on it by all material atoms. Bring in Faraday’s
centers of force: The lines of force emitted in every direction from
every center bring to bear upon each the influence of the whole
material world. Call up the Leibnizian monads: Each is the mirror
of the universe.
At variance with Pribram (1971), for Bergson the brain is not simply a
“hologram”. In the holographic process, several object waves, respectively
reflected from an object can be recorded on a holographic plate, with the
object wave interfering with a reference wave of some unique frequency
(f1, f2, ..., cf. Figure 8). A reconstructive wave, successively modulated
to one of the original reference frequencies and beamed or passed through
the set of interference patterns now superimposed and recorded on the
holographic plate, is successively specific to the original source of the
object wave.
To place Bergson’s view in modern terms (Robbins 2000, 2002, 2006,
2007, 2009, 2012a), the brain is the modulated reconstructive wave passing
through the external, holographic matter-field. The dynamics of the brain
must be viewed as supporting this very concrete wave, specific to a past
source in the field – a past portion and extent of the field’s motion at a
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Figure 8: Holographic reconstruction. The reconstructive wave, modu-
lated to frequency f1, reconstructs the stored wave front (image) of a
cube. The reconstructive wave, modulated to frequency f2, now recon-
structs the wave front of the cup.
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by the brain nor is it represented or encoded in the brain. It is simply
a diminution of, a selection from, the entire holographic field as a whole.
The dynamic state of the brain is just specific to this subset of the field
and its motion.7
As noted above, the specification always refers to the past of the field.
The fly’s wing-beats being specified have long gone into the past, but the
undivided motion of the field with its intrinsic, primary memory supports
this past-specification. The fly’s motion with its wing-beats does not
consist of a series of instants, each of which immediately enters the non-
existence of the past as the present instant arrives. The image, too, is
right where it says it is – in the field. It is the field – the (specified) past
of the field – at a specific scale of time.
Similarly, even one second of the strobed, rotating cube is in real-
ity a vast series of (interpenetrating) states within the external, ever-
transforming holographic field. Each state in this series contains a slightly
different orientation of the cube. Under the out-of-phase strobe, the opti-
mal specification is to a superposition of this series (at a particular scale of
time) wherein the rigid edges and vertices are lost and the image appears
as a wobbly, plastic-like non-cube.
Even illusions – the great redoubt for the ubiquitous conception that
the brain must somehow generate the image – are but optimal specifica-
tions of events in the field. Even the lack of processing during a saccade,
argued by indirect realists (Smythies 2002) to prove that the brain must
generate an image to maintain the illusion of a continuous world, can be
countered by noting that the reconstructive wave supported by the brain
need not cease during a saccade.
As argued before, the brain dynamics supporting the specification de-
termines the specified scale of time, and the chemical velocities underlying
that dynamics are responsible for this. Increase these velocities (or, equiv-
alently, the energy state of the body/brain), and the fly transitions from
a buzzing fly to a fly barely flapping its wings like a heron, to a motionless
being, to a vibrating, crystalline structure. Again, scale implies quality.
Specification of a qualitative field always occurs at a scale of time. In this
view, what we have construed as abstract computations processing in the
brain (and responding to the invariance structure of external events) are
in fact integral to a very concrete, dynamical device supporting a very
concrete wave form.
7In other words, as Bergson noted, this field with its holgraphic properties, is per-
ception – pure perception, as he called it. The problem is not how perception arises, it
is how it is limited.
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8. The Image as Virtual Action
The continuous modulation of the brain (as a wave) is driven by the
invariance structure of the transforming external events, e.g., the velocity
flows defined over the sides of the cube as it is rotating conjoined with
its symmetry period.8 Due to the continuous motion of the field, this
information is always inherently uncertain – there is always an optimal
specification of the past motion of the field. As we have seen, a recon-
structive wave, passing through a hologram and successively modulated
to different frequencies, successively selects information from the multiple,
superimposed wave fronts originally recorded on the hologram, and succes-
sively specifies each source. If modulated to a non-coherent (non-unique
or composite) frequency, it specifies a fuzzed superposition of the sources.
There is no “veridical” selection. So too, the brain, as a reconstructive
wave, selects information from the ever transforming, holographic matter-
field, where the principle of selection is based on information (invariants)
relatable to the body’s action systems.
Bergson visualized this holographic field as a vast field of “real ac-
tions”. Any given “object” acts upon all other objects in the field, and
is in turn acted upon by all other objects. It is in fact obliged (Bergson
1896/1912, p. 28)
to transmit the whole of what it receives, to oppose every action
with an equal and contrary reaction, to be, in short, merely the
road by which pass, in every direction the modifications, or what
can be termed real actions propagated throughout the immensity
of the entire universe.
In his succinct phrase, perception is virtual action, i.e., perception is the
display (or selection) of possible action in the field relative to the body.
Following hard on the passage describing the “photograph developed in
the very heart of things and at all points in space”, Bergson (1896/1912,
pp. 31f, emphasis added) noted:
Only if when we consider any other given place in the universe
we can regard the action of all matter as passing through it with-
out resistance and without loss, and the photograph of the whole
as translucent: Here there is wanting behind the plate the black
screen on which the image could be shown. Our “zones of inde-
termination” [organisms] play in some sort the part of that screen.
They add nothing to what is there; they effect merely this: That
the real action passes through, the virtual action remains.
8Elsewhere (Robbins 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2012a, 2012b) I developed the notion
of invariance structures in more detail. An invariance structure can be defined as the
transformations and invariants determining an event and rendering it a virtual action.
This issue is particularly important to the theory of memory and cognition.
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This, it can be argued, is significant for the intimate feedback to and
from the brain’s motor areas to the visual areas, i.e., the modulation of
the visual areas by the motor areas (Churchland 1994). It is consonant
with the finding that perceptions reflect the body’s biolological action
capabilities (Viviani and Stucchi 1992, Viviani and Mounoud 1990, Glen-
berg 1997). It is also significant for the fact, noted by Weiskrantz (1997),
that upon severing the tracks from the motor areas to the visual areas,
monkeys undergoing the procedure went blind (Nakamura and Mishkin
1980, 1982). With no connection to action, there is no selection, no virtual
action, and no vision.
There is yet a deeper, ultimately testable implication that derives from
the principle of virtual action: The heron-like fly slowly flapping its wings
is also a specification of the action possible to the body at this particular
scale of time. This reflects the ability to move the hand leisurely to catch
the fly by the wing.
9. Subject and Object in the Temporal Metaphysics
The holographic properties of the field entail that the state of each
event reflects the mass of influences from the whole and therefore repre-
sents a state of very elemental “awareness” of the whole. This awareness
is a field property. It is not elementary constituents with ad hoc intrinsic
and extrinsic properties that must be composed. The brain’s specifica-
tion, then, is simultaneous to a time-scale specific form of the vast, taut
web of awareness defined throughout the field.
At the null scale of time, there is no difference between subject and
object. There is one continuous field, a field with undivided extension. It
is not infinitely divisible, it does not consist of external elements. Run-
ning the scaling transformation in reverse, the fly transitions from waves
in the field undifferentiated from the perceiving subject to a crystalline,
vibrating being, then to the motionless fly, then the heron-like fly slowly
flapping its wings, and finally to the buzzing fly of normal scale. Sub-
ject differentiates itself from object. This is the meaning of Bergson’s
(1896/1912, p. 77) statement: “Questions relating to subject and object,
to their distinction and their union, must be put in terms of time rather
than of space.”
The body-brain is a modulated reconstructive wave passing through
a holographic universal field, specific to a subset, to a time-scaled im-
age of the past motion of the field’s undivided motion, and reflective of
possible action. This is the beautifully elegant solution of the universe
to the problem of specifying an image of the external world for its living
organisms. Nearly fifty years before Gabor, the father of holography, this
was Bergson’s remarkable insight.
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10. Color and Form
Color has been a star exhibit in the debates on qualia. Color is quality.
And form is quality, too. Both are optimal specifications of the past mo-
tion of the material field at a certain scale of time. The brain is confronted
with a standard environment of ever-changing illumination and shadow.
No color remains the same for a moment in this changing ambience. It
is the same story as with form: The brain is presented, constantly, with
a field of dynamic flux. Zeki (1993) hypothesized that the brain isolates
invariants of spectral reflectance from this flux, where the spectral re-
flectance profile of an object is given by the percentage of incident light
reflected by that object.
There are multiple apparent problems, all supporting the view that
there are no straightforward properties, such as reflectances, that spec-
ify color. Metamers, for example, are stimuli with different spectral re-
flectance distributions that produce the same experienced color. There is
also the complex web of similarity relations among colors. Purple is more
similar to blue than green, red is more similar to other shades of red. In
this complex, there is a structure of opposition: Red is opposed to green in
the sense that no reddish shade is greenish, and the same holds for yellow
and blue. There are unique hues (red, yellow, green, blue) and binary hues
(purple, orange, olive, turquoise), perceptual mixtures of the unique hues.
All of this appears as a problem for a qualitative field supporting color.
The consensus is that there is no mapping from such physical properties
to the subjective color experience.
The same thing is true of form. There is no simple mapping to the
wobbly cube of Shaw and McIntyre. There is no mapping to the non-
rigid ellipse. In each case, the brain performs its best to isolate invariance
and to create an optimal specification of some aspect of the past motion
of the external material field, be it form, sound or color. In this respect,
Byrne and Hilbert (2003) argued that visual experience represents objects
as having proportions of hue-magnitudes. Using their example, we can
specify the size of a rectangle by the product of two properties, height h
and width w. We can say that rectangle A has a height that is 25% of its
width, or B has a height that is 20% of its width. In this way, we express
A and B by proportions of magnitudes of h and w.
Similarly, focusing only on hue, we need the four hue-magnitudes R
(red), Y (yellow), G (green), and B (blue), the sum of which will be the
object’s total hue. A purple object is, say, 0.55(R) and 0.45(B), a blue
object is perhaps 0.99(B) with very small proportions of R, Y and G.
When we look at a tomato, the representational content (as per Byrne
and Hilbert 2003) is not simply red, but rather the tomato is 0.80(R) and
0.20(Y). If we take L-intensity, M-intensity and S-intensity as the degree
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to which light stimulates L, M and S cones, respectively,9 then an object is
uniquely red, in terms of hue-magnitudes, if it reflects light with a greater
L-intensity than M-intensity; the greater the difference, the greater the
value of R.
Byrne and Hilbert (2003) talk about “representational content”, but
they have no theory of the origin of the external image, colored or not.
This means that they do not really know what “representational content”
is. Once the ambient light from the external environment is transduced
to the neural-chemical code of the brain, representationalism has no re-
sources to solve the coding problem – it cannot explain how the coded
“representation” is unpacked as the external image. We may, however,
equally construe the representation as specification. The dynamical ap-
paratus supporting this specification, with its L, M, and S cones, selects
information from the matter-field relative to action, just as a reconstruc-
tive wave selects information from the holographic plate.
Again, unless the matter-field is already qualitative, the generation by
the brain of colored representations remains as miraculous as the genera-
tion of form. Color and form must then be assumed in some space outside
of the abstract, homogeneous continuum of the classic metaphysics. But,
in truth, the very concept that the process of perception begins with a
matter-field without quality is the misconception of the classic, spatial
metaphysics.
11. Conclusion
What has been described in this article is a theory of direct perception
or direct realism. In its principle of optimal specification it is far from
a naive realism. Gibson’s (1966, 1979) ecological theory is its natural
complement. For Gibson an invariant defined only over time, e.g., over a
flow field, cannot exist in an instant. It is not a bit that travels along the
nerves. This is why Gibson gravitated toward the notion of the resonating
brain, where invariants or complex structures of invariants are supported
over the resonant feedback of the brain, i.e. over a continuous, undivided
flow.
According to Gibson this resonating brain is specific to the external
environment. But (to Gibson) there are no representations, there is no
image arising within this resonating brain, no more than there can be an
image in a computer and its bit patterns. But yet, here is an image of
the environment – what my resonating brain is specific to – my desktop
surface with its computer and its lamp and its miniature John Deere farm
tractor. Unless one is going to dismiss this as a delusion of introspection,
9L, M, S stand for long, medium, short wavelength sensitivity of the cells of the
retina, called cones. Their values range between -1 and +1.
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the origin of this image of the external world must be explained. This is
why I have argued that Gibson must be placed in Bergson’s holographic
framework (Robbins 2000). His “specific to” must be taken in the same
way as a reconstructive wave – passing through a hologram which holds
a myriad of recorded wave fronts – is “specific to” one selected source.
Bergson’s temporal metaphysics and his holographic insight is required to
make Gibson’s theory of direct perception coherent.
As a general framework for a model of the brain in perception, this
has certainly been a very high-level “specification”. The concept of a
holographic field has at least a decent status in physics (Bekenstein 2003,
Bohm 1980), but conceptualizing the brain and its operations due to a
holographic field has received no attention. My major suggestion is that
the model of the brain with its processes as comprising a reconstructive
wave must incorporate the fact that the brain responds to ecological in-
variance laws. Brain models must include how the wave incorporates these
laws for the specification of events.
Could such a device be artificially constructed? Yes, if what is required
to create the requisite real concrete dynamics can be built in artificial, as
opposed to biological, materials. One does not build the real dynamics
required for an AC motor out of rubber bands and toothpicks. Nor can its
operative dynamics be described, or more precisely, be built, constructed
or function in the abstract space and time of the classic metaphysics.
Nor can its operative dynamics be described in the abstract space and
time of the classic metaphysics.
The abstract space and abstract time of the classic metaphysics is just
as meaningless to the operations of Gibson’s resonating brain or Bergson’s
modulated wave as it is to the growth processes of trees. The brain does
not actually operate in the point-continuum of this metaphysics. As a
physical device, the brain knows nothing about the continuum; it does not
exist to the brain. The continuum is a conceptual derivative, a resultant
from processes of the brain that a conscious being applies conceptually to
external reality and its events, including the brain and its operations. But,
according to Bergson, the brain works in an entirely different metaphysical
structure. Thus, when a theorist drives the critical question down to the
need to implement the biology of the brain (e.g., Searle 2000), we do in
fact enter the question of the proper metaphysics.
The hard problem of consciousness with its core, the origin of qualia,
is a child of the abstract space of the classic metaphysics. This great
abstraction has become a projection frame for much theoretical work.
It is a projection frame that has forced out all deeper consideration of
the nature of time and its relationship to mind. Its facile treatment of
time and motion has blinded theorists to the fundamental question of the
memory that supports our perception of rotating cubes, twisting leaves
and buzzing flies, to the point of obscuring the very possibility that these
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dynamic forms themselves are qualities that must be explained. Finally,
and most remarkably, it has even managed to subvert all understanding
of the hard problem of consciousness: the explanation of the origin of our
image, in perception, of the external world.
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